1LR 6.5.1R is intended to ensure that the protection afforded to stockholders by premium rating requirements is reasonable. The obligation to enter into a relationship agreement is defined in the new LR 6.1.4ER (1). The meaning of a “controlling shareholder” will be identical to the previous definition of listings prior to 2005. In addition, a new LR 9.2.2AR (1) requires an issuer to have a relationship agreement with all controlling shareholders for the duration of its listing (not just at the time of admission). neither the controlling shareholder nor its associated companies take steps that would ensure that the applicant meets its obligations under the listing rules; and – Whistleblower obligation – Premium publicly traded companies are now required to immediately notify the ACF of a breach of certain outstanding obligations. These include the obligation to manage an independent company and, where appropriate, to have a relationship agreement and a dual voting structure for the election of independent directors. Controlling Shareholder Relations Agreement The Board of Directors confirms that, in accordance with the listing rules, the Company entered into a relationship agreement with Wittington and the Directors of the Foundation on November 14, 2014, containing the necessary obligations (the amended and reissued “relational agreement” on June 25, 2020). The new rules will take into account a number of other changes in this area. The rule that an applicant applying for a list of bonuses must prove that he or she controls a large part of his assets has been removed, so that only the condition of being able to prove to the company that it can exercise as a primary activity is removed. The list rules also identify factors that may indicate that a new applicant does not meet this requirement. 1 An applicant with a controlling shareholder must, after the approval, having a written and legally binding agreement with its controlling shareholder: which aims to ensure that the controlling shareholder respects its obligations: the applicant, given its understanding of the relationship between the majority shareholders concerned, reasonably considers that a controlling shareholder can obtain the respect of another dominant shareholder and the majority shareholder`s shareholding shareholders with the LR 6.5.4R companies; and according to the rules of the list, the FSA cannot currently impose any obligation or sanction against controlling shareholders. Although the FSA stated that the imposition of an ongoing commitment to a relationship agreement would give it more leeway to enforce it, it will nevertheless face the dilemma that the application of available sanctions against the issuer, such as a fine, a standard rating or even the removal of the list to the detriment of independent shareholders, will be , could be protected by the proposed amendments. The consultation period is expected to close on 2 January 2013 and the FSA is expected to publish its reactions in the spring of 2013.
The proposed amendments are primarily at the request of the FSA to better protect minority investors. This stems from the criticism that the credibility of the premium listing segment has been compromised by the fact that publicly traded companies do not properly regulate relationships with their controlling shareholders.